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Abstract 
Consociational democracy has increasingly been adopted as a useful approach for conflict 
transformation in ethnic and violently divided societies. Its ultimate purpose is to turn former rivals 
into governing allies by providing power-sharing arrangements. Through theoretically driven 
process tracing, based on Kosovo as a case study, this article explores whether and how 
consociationalism has affected peace- and state-building. By examining its application through 
institutional design, it investigates citizenship policy and the role of the European Union on fostering 
a multi-ethnic society. The article argues that the existing corporate consociational model has 
institutionalised ethnicity challenging democracy and statehood, and did not promote a shared 
identity. Therefore, to overcome ethnic division and strengthen state legitimacy, the paper proposes a 
modification of consociational democracy into a liberal type promoted by a more persuasive role of 
the EU.  
Keywords: Kosovo, consociationalism, citizenship, European Union, ethnic relations, state-building.  
Introduction 
One of the main challenges in post-conflict societies is managing group diversity and 
rivalry through institutional engineering that improves ethnic relations and produces 
sustainable peace (Goodwin 2007; Weller 2009). From the theoretical point of view, 
consociationalism is among the most commonly proposed approaches for settling 
conflict and managing diversity in divided societies (McGarry and O’Leary 1993; 
Norris 2008; Taylor 2009). It is known as the power-sharing model, which entails 
participation and representation of all main ethnic or other groups in the governing 
institutions and decision-making processes. This theory became prominent, among 
other scholars, throught the works of the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart 
(1977), who argued that consensual democracy might mitigate ethnic conflict and 
tensions in multi-ethnic societies in a way that majoritarian democracy might not. As 
a conflict management model, it has been widely applied in different post-conflict 
states, and in crucial aspects of peace and state-building efforts (Wolff and Yakinthou 
2013; Aitken 2007). The list of post-conflict states with peace agreements that contain 
consociational features in, and thus in institutional and constitutional arrangements is 
long; it includes some prominent cases such as Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, 
Afghanistan etc. (Schneckener 2002; Sriram 2008; Taylor 2009) Consociationalism is 
defined by the following characteristics: a proportional electoral system, a grand 
coalition formed by political leaders of all significant groups, minority veto rights on 
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government decision-making, and a certain degree of autonomy or self-government 
for those communities (Norris 2008).  
Conceptually, consociationalism as a conflict management model may be attractive; 
however, the difficulties with the existing power-sharing model are evident in some 
former Yugoslav and post-conflict states, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
and Kosovo. While the armed conflicts in these states ceased about two decades ago, 
ethnic tensions remain, and reconciliation and mutual trust between communities are 
still missing. Consociationalism, as an approach for conflict resolution and 
management of diversity, in these cases has not been proven suitable and effective in 
mitigating ethnic divisions (Simonsen 2005; Tansey 2009; Rossi 2014). Although, 
Macedonia with the new government in power has achieved significant progress in this 
manner: solving the name dispute with Greece (named officially North Macedonia); 
becoming a new NATO member; and successively implementing consociational 
principles, for example wider use of bilingualism. By comparing the abovementioned 
cases, Bieber and Keil (2009) assessed the achievements of power-sharing in these 
states, concluding that there are mixed results and suggesting substantial 
modifications of the existing provisions. The main criticism consists of the fact that 
these arrangements have contributed more to power-dividing (strict territorial and 
ethnic identity boundaries) than to power-sharing, thus hindering the development of 
multi-ethnic democracy and long-term political stability (Simonsen 2005; Aitken 
2007; Landau 2017). The consociational provisions in these states, rather than being 
the outcome of a political consensus among communities, were primarily imposed by 
internationally mediated agreements (McCulloch 2014). While this achieved formal 
participation of rival parties in institution-building, it did not also realise the 
integration of ethnic groups into a multiethnic society. These negotiated settlements 
include the Dayton Peace Accord for Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994); the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement for Macedonia (2001); and the Comprehensive Proposal for 
Kosovo Status Settlement, known as the Ahtisaari Plan (2007). This agreement is 
specifically significant for Kosovo’s institutional and constitutional architecture, 
created as a result of an internationally negotiated plan (Weller 2008). This proposal 
entails power-sharing arrangements, including ethnic quotas in courts, police and 
state-owned companies, official bilingualism, veto rights and self-government at the 
local level which were incorporated later into the Constitution of Kosovo and adopted 
a few months after the Declaration of Independence on 17 February 2008. However, 
some consociational provisions such as reserved seats in the parliament and 
guaranteed representation in the central government for non-majority communities 
had been in place almost from the beginning of the international protectorate in 1999 
by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission—UNMIK (Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-Government 2001).  
Focusing on the Kosovo state-building process, the central research question raised 
here is how consociationalism has impacted state legitimacy and ethnic relations. 
Further, it examines citizenship policy and its impact on shaping shared identity and 
political unity among all ethnic communities. The central assumption is that the 
current type of corporate consociationalism in Kosovo, as envisaged by the Ahtisaari 
Plan, has institutionalised ethnicity as a precondition for political engagement and 
representation, thus hindering state legitimacy and incentives to build a democratic 
and multi-ethnic society. In other words, consociationalism may be considered a useful 
tool for conflict resolution through the accommodation of minority groups, rather than 





The research follows a theory-guided process based on a single case study, content 
analysis of relevant reports, and legal acts, and the broad use of a literature review. To 
accomplish this, it focuses on the ethnic relations between Albanian and Serb 
communities in Kosovo, traced in a post-conflict context. 1  The consociational 
provisions will be examined in their four ascribed dimensions: government by a grand 
coalition of all communities, segmental autonomy as self-government at municipality 
level, proportional electoral system, and mutual veto right. The next section addresses 
the citizenship issue, elaborating it in the context of the identity formation process. It 
does so by discussing on one hand the legal framework and consociational provisions 
regarding citizenship and how these constitute relations between the state and society 
and on the other hand examining if these policies have contributed to the emergence 
of an identity that goes beyond ethnic belonging. In the end, conclusions will be drawn, 
through a critical review of consociational arrangements and their overall impact on 
the state-building process. 
Consociationalism in divided societies 
The issue of how political settlements are to be adopted in post-conflict and divided 
societies has received growing attention not only in academia but also by decision-
makers (Sriram 2008; Wolff 2011; Cammett and Malesky 2012). Its application also 
includes the political settlement of Kosovo’s final status, where the primary challenge 
was finding the institutional framework that would effectively manage ethnic diversity 
and promote long-lasting peace. The most prominent theoretical model for solving this 
concern was that of consociational democracy, which includes institutional, 
constitutional, self-governing, and power-sharing arrangements (Jarstad 2008: 105-
133). It has found broad application in different societies of mixed ethnicities, 
nationalities, and religions or post-conflict countries (Taylor 2009: 1-11). The term 
consociational model of democracy refers to plural and divided communities in which 
cleavages are reflected in ethnic, religious, racial, cultural and other diversities among 
members of the society (Norris 2008: 22-27). Or as Andeweg (2000: 520) accurately 
pointed out: “Consociational democracy is defined by a deeply divided society and by 
elite cooperation; in other words, both the problem and its solution are part of the 
definition.” 
In the ideal case, consociation is a model of democracy which enables peace and 
stability in deeply divided societies. In his cardinal work ‘Democracy in Plural 
Societies: A comparative exploration’ (1977), Arend Lijphart was among the first to 
promote this model. Although this book focuses mainly on the mitigation of tensions 
in democratic pluralist societies, the theoretical approach was developed further as an 
analytical framework, especially for the post-conflict and multi-ethnic societies. In 
Lijphart’s explanatory model, consociational democracy includes various 
arrangements, containing models of grand coalition governments, in which all ethnic 
groups participate and are represented, segmental autonomy, an electoral system of 
proportionality, and minority or mutual veto right (Lijphart 1977: 25-47). The 
consociational model may involve any of the following types of practices: territorial 
autonomy and federal or confederal arrangements, communal federations based on 
ethnic populations, proportional representation in the administration, a proportional 
electoral system with consensus decision rules, a legal framework that guarantees 
                                                      
1 Although Kosovo Albanians constitute the absolute majority of the population, ethnic relations and disputes with 
the Serb minority continue to determine security, political affairs and state-building in Kosovo.    
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minority rights (Sisk 1996: 47-67). Regarding post-conflict state-building, it has two 
major dimensions of institutional design: power-sharing and self-governing (Wolff 
2011: 1777-1802). Consociationalism is an approach to democratic development in 
plural societies with segmental cleavages, emphasising elite cooperation and 
institutional engineering through the creation of stable multi-ethnic coalition 
governments and other power-sharing institutions, thus developing a political culture 
of consensus (Taylor 2009).  
Although consociational arrangements can effectively manage conflict and decrease 
security tensions in the initial phase, in the long-term, they can generate other serious 
problems (Snyder 2000; Jarstad 2009). One of the most critical voices of the 
consociational approach is Donald Horowitz (1993: 18-38), who acknowledges that 
ethnic conflicts may be brought to an end by consociational arrangements, but the 
durability of those settlements and their accomplishments remain very uncertain. 
Finlay (2011: 38), another critic of the model, highlights that “the problem with 
consociational arrangements is that they make ethnicity normative” by 
institutionalising antagonistic identities and thus hindering reconciliation among 
former conflicting groups. According to Aitken (2007: 260) “Institutionalizing 
ethnicity, in a constitutional settlement, freezes ethnic divisions at the moment of 
greatest tension and limits the possibilities of a later decline in the salience of 
ethnicity.” Particularly in the early state-building process, these rigid power-sharing 
instruments may adversely influence political stability and democratisation, which 
“often means deadlock, inefficient governments, and institutionalisation of 
polarisation in already divided societies” (Jarstad 2009: 42). Additionally, a concern 
that needs to be considered is if and to what extent consociationalism contributes to 
citizenship as the basis for shared identity. Concerning identity building and 
democratisation process, Snyder (2000: 36) argues against those stagnant 
arrangements.  
Purported solutions to ethnic conflict that take predemocratic identities as 
fixed, such as, ethno-federalism, ethnic power-sharing, and the granting of 
group rights, may needlessly lock in mutually exclusive, inimical national 
identities. In contrast, creating an institutional setting for democratisation that 
de-emphasises ethnicity might turn these identities towards more inclusive, 
civic self-conceptions.  
The present situation in Kosovo and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
revealed similar impasses, namely, instead of promoting political and social inclusion, 
the use of power-sharing has contributed to the reinforcement of ethnic divisions. By 
examining diverse case studies (Sri Lanka, Sudan and Colombia) Sriram (2008: vi) 
raises similar concerns, stating that power-sharing arrangements can impose habits of 
ethnic competition and mistrust into newly emerging institutions that cannot 
efficiently if at all, manage conflict. That means ethnic groups might freeze animosities 
and achieve short-term peace but do not engage actively and truthfully to overcome 
divisions in society and to solve the conflict entirely. Even though the idea of 
consociational democracy is to encourage cooperation, beginning with the political 
elites and moving across all levels of a community, identity politics is mostly neglected. 
By focusing primarily on reaching short-term peace through institutional and 
constitutional arrangements, it takes identities as fixed and given and offers no model 
or indication how to provide and enhance long-term cross-cultural and multi-ethnic 





like John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (2009), and McCulloch (2014) pay more 
attention to the identity issue. In this context, they distinguish between corporate and 
liberal consociationalism. The first derives primarily from peace accords, political 
settlements, plans or other forms of internationally negotiated agreements. This type 
describes what Lijphart (1977) has regarded as ‘centrifugal democracy’, where societies 
remain fragmented through ethnic or other cleavages. This model does not primarily 
treat citizens as individuals but only as members of the ethnic group, through 
institutional and constitutional entrenchment of group representation (McCulloch 
2014). On the other hand, liberal consociationalism is grounded in the deliberative or 
consensual forms between diverse groups and segments within that society. This form 
does not determine in advance the ones who share power, leaving that to the voters, 
who can decide about political identities and group representation (McCulloch 2014). 
The main difference between these two types is that corporate consociation 
accommodates groups according to specific and predetermined criteria, and rests on 
the assumption that group identities are fixed. 
Contrary to that, liberal consociationalism is based on the idea that political identity is 
expressed in democratic elections, no matter whether these identities are bound to 
ethnic groups or any other form of belonging or not (McGarry and O’Leary 2009). 
Liberal consociation empowers citizens, not only political elites, through democratic 
elections, to influence consociational institutions and arrangements. Unlike the 
corporate model, which contains the constitutional embedding of community 
representation “liberal consociationalism avoids constitutionally entrenching group 
representation by leaving the question of who shares power in the hands of voters” 
(McCulloch 2014: 503). The corporate-liberal differences are additionally relevant for 
the academic debates on consociationalism since they represent:  
an essential modification to a consociational theory that addresses one of its 
more profound, and empirically more valid, criticisms, namely that (corporate) 
consociations further entrench and institutionalise preexisting, and often 
conflict-hardened, ethnic identities, thus decreasing the incentives for elites to 
moderate (Wolff 2011: 1783). 
As McCulloch (2014) also explained the liberal type of consociationalism, as a long-
term solution for divided societies, in any of the above categories, is challenging to 
implement in reality. The challenges encountered in the implementation of both 
approaches include the ability to manage the complexities of the particular situation 
which may include any of the following factors: demographic constellation of the 
population, loyalty of the groups to the state, the role of domestic political elites, and 
the impact of international actors as third parties in reaching settlements and 
completing their implementation. These issues are significant in the case of Kosovo as 
well, where the corporate consociation model is in place. Therefore, the application of 
existing arrangements is highly complicated, posing serious challenges to the 
legitimacy of the state (Landau 2017; Rossi 2014). Therefore, the modification of 
consociationalism from the corporate model into the liberal type may offer better 
chances for representative democracy, serving the interest of the entire citizenry rather 
than ethnic elites, as a precondition to overcome ethnic separation.   
Consociational democracy in Kosovo 
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Similarly to other state-building missions, the international community in Kosovo has 
shown more interest in temporary political stability and security than in genuine 
democratisation and reconciliation of conflicting groups (Chesterman 2004; Tansey 
2009: 109-151). After nearly a decade of international administration and failed 
negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia to find a long-term peaceful solution for 
political status, the UN Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo came up with a 
comprehensive proposal of ‘supervised independence’ for Kosovo (Weller 2009). The 
plan for the future status of Kosovo contained power-sharing arrangements, as part of 
a broader strategy of peace-building efforts. Some basic power-sharing instruments 
were taken into consideration and, to a certain extent, implemented during the UNMIK 
protectorate (Taylor 2005). As Bieber and Keil (2009: 344) put it: “the UN introduced 
in 2001 a constitutional framework for Kosovo, which included power-sharing 
elements, such as minority representation.” Therefore, the experience of Kosovo in 
power-sharing arrangements is a useful example to evaluate the overall impact of 
consociationalism in the state-building process.  
Concerning electoral arrangements, Kosovo applies the proportional electoral system 
by open-list within a single constituency and a 5% threshold that enables 
representation of ethnic groups in parliament in proportion to their numbers (Law on 
General Elections in the Republic of Kosovo 2008). Non-majority communities (Serbs, 
Bosnians, Turks, Gorani and Roma-Ashkali-Egyptian [RAE] communities) have 
additional guarantees and an over-proportional number of twenty seats in the 
Assembly of Kosovo (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo 2008: Chapter VI. Art. 
63.). Furthermore, Article 64 of the Constitution states that “twenty (20) of the one 
hundred twenty (120) seats are guaranteed for representation of communities that are 
not in the majority in Kosovo”.  
This electoral design leaves neither space for incentives in creating multi-ethnic parties 
nor encourages moderate political elites oriented towards reconciliation and inter-
ethnic cooperation (Cammett and Malesky 2012). On the contrary, it only reinforces 
ethnic division through institutionalising and consequently cementing political 
differences. Wise and Agarin (2017: 99-124) support this argument by examining the 
2013 local and the 2014 national election in Kosovo, concluding that voting of the 
electorate and political parties continue to be dominated by ethnic belonging. In the 
first place existing political elites act as ethnic entrepreneurs, gaining legitimacy 
mainly from the previous conflict; secondly because the political discourse is shaped 
by one-sided collective memory, narratives and commemoration of the war, 
communities have completely opposite political goals. This results in political parties 
mobilising voters only among their ‘own’ ethnicity (Baliqi 2018; Wise and Agarin 
2017).  
In addition to the electoral system, the Constitution provides significant veto power to 
the representatives of the minority ethnic groups in Kosovo’s Parliament in the 
constitutional amendment procedure, and in regards to vital interests of communities 
such as language, education and community symbols. Every amendment of the 
Constitution requires the approval by two-thirds of all deputies of the Assembly 
including two-thirds of all deputies of the non-majority communities (Constitution of 
the Republic of Kosovo 2008: Art. 144). Nevertheless, veto power over important 
decisions may undermine governance functionality and efficiency. A case in point here 
could be the postponement of the recent draft law on the transformation of the Kosovo 





requires the vote of two-thirds of the non-majority communities. Drafted in 2016 it has 
not yet proceeded to Parliament because of the Kosovo-Serb MPs threat of using their 
veto power against the amendments. The main reason behind this refusal is the dispute 
concerning the future status of the University of North Mitrovica, which is compatible 
with Serbian and but not the Kosovo higher education system (den Boer and van der 
Borgh 2011). 
The Grand Coalition principle of consociationalism has applied to the composition of 
Kosovo’s executive over nearly the past two decades. The Kosovo-Serbs and other 
ethnic group parties are commonly part of government coalitions. Since the first 
parliamentary elections in post-conflict Kosovo, held in November 2001, government 
was formed by a ‘broad coalition’ between different political parties, including 
Albanian, Serb and other community parties (Wise and Agarin 2017). As a 
consequence, voting occurs mainly based on ethnicity, and political representation 
continues to be based not on issues but merely on ethnicity (Mjekiqi & Gallagher 2015). 
In this context, an unintended consequence of the power-sharing arrangements is 
voter segregation rather than their integration, thus hindering democratisation of the 
party system.   
Segmental autonomy, as one of the core features of consociationalism, has been 
applied in Kosovo partially through decentralisation and self-government at the local 
level (Wolff 2011). Kosovo’s Constitution and the respective legal framework grants a 
high degree of autonomy to local governments, in different aspects of social, economic, 
cultural, and religious life (Bieber and Keil 2009). The municipalities in Kosovo have 
a wide range of authority, such as local economic development, primary health care, as 
well as primary and secondary education. Serb-majority municipalities were awarded 
‘enhanced authority’ giving them new self-governing decision making power at the 
local level in the area of cultural heritage, higher education, and the appointment of 
the Police Station Commander (Burema 2013). However, instead of constituting local 
autonomy and self-government, the decentralisation process reinforced 
marginalisation of the local ethnic communities, leading to enclavisation and isolation 
of local populations (Dahlman and Williams 2010: 424). Segmental autonomy as 
territorial self-government of communities, as the case of the possibility of an 
establishment of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalties shows, raises several 
concerns including the dilemma of loyalty to the state authority; how the division of 
authority between central and self-government local institutions is to be regulated; and 
the paradox of whether this territorial accommodation is secession-inducing or 
secession-preventing (Cornell 2002). Other critics argue that territorial arrangements 
may undermine legitimacy and commitment to the state, thus exacerbating ethnic 
division (Erk and Anderson 2009; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 1999). However, self-
government at the local level and the possibility of horizontal links between 
municipalities do not necessarily contravene the consociational principle. Moreover, it 
has been taken into account in the Ahtisaari Proposal and Kosovo Constitution (Wolff 
2009). However, the extent of the authority and mandate of this eventual ‘Association’ 
and how it might affect state unity and legitimacy in the long term remain unclear. 
The role of the EU in peace and state-building 
The consociational principles above discussed are also crucial components in Kosovo’s 
state-building process. Moreover, the constitutional design is also in the spirit of 
consociational democracy, whereby the Republic of Kosovo is defined as a multi-ethnic 
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state and provides specific rights for non-majority communities. Among these 
accommodations provided by the Constitution is the provision that Kosovo is bilingual, 
Albanian and Serbian being official languages. On the other hand, the success of the 
abovementioned consociational features in integrating all segments in deeply divided 
societies depends on the democratic quality of representation rather than merely 
formal and institutional presence. In the past, UNMIK administration made the 
Serbian government in Belgrade the chief advocate for Kosovo Serbs interests, thus 
undermining internal dialogue and political cooperation between the Albanian and 
Serb communities in Kosovo. The international community tolerated this patronage of 
Belgrade because it was not interested in provoking open confrontation with Serbia 
and its allied states like Russia, China, Greece etc. The involvement of the Serbian 
government in the Serb-populated areas of Kosovo has effectively imposed it as 
negotiation power. Other factors are strong financial, social and historical dependence 
of local Serb communities on their kin ‘homeland’ as an exclusive political 
representative of their interests, leaving almost no room for UNMIK to overcome the 
Serbian role in decision-making processes about community issues. For instance, 
education and healthcare systems provided for the Serb population continue to be 
financed by and operated under authority of the Serbian government as ‘parallel 
systems’. According to van der Borgh (2012: 37) the purpose of these institutions is not 
only administrative or to provide public services for local Serbs, but mostly “to 
strengthen the Serbian state’s presence in Kosovo and to counter the international 
statebuilding project.” 
Also, this hampers Kosovo-Serbs attempts to develop their own political elites 
independent of the Serbian government. Even the negotiations between Kosovo and 
Serbia, started in 2011 through the European Union (EU) mediation and known as 
‘dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,’ have not significantly improved interethnic 
relations.2 The reason for this lack of improvement can be found in the uncertainties 
produced in the negotiation process and the fact that most of the agreements are being 
implemented only partially, if at all (Bieber 2015). Further, both sides constantly blame 
each other for being destructive, followed by populist rhetoric and fearmongering 
about potential aggression, territorial secession or even open conflict. Meanwhile, 
inter-ethnic dialogue and real concerns about socio-economic conditions of local 
communities are ignored. According to the last survey on the Kosovo- Serbia dialogue, 
76% of Albanians were dissatisfied with this process, and only 11.3% of Serbs in Kosovo 
claimed to be satisfied (Kosovo Democratic Institute 2018). Nevertheless, these 
negotiations, through EU conditionality and ongoing diplomatic pressure, have 
managed to dissolve Serbian ‘parallel’ judiciary and security systems and achieved the 
integration of these systems in Kosovar institutions. Further, the dialogue achieved an 
increase in Serb participation in local and national elections, creating premises for 
better integration of the Serb community in other institutions and domains of everyday 
life. The final results of the negotiations will determine the outcome and directions of 
the consociational democracy. These negotiations could significantly change 
interethnic relations in a positive way if an agreement is reached by opening the 
perspective for a truly multi-ethnic society and state legitimisation. However, if the 
agreement and broad political consensus fail, it might further deepen ethnic division, 
                                                      
2 The Brussels Negotiations resulted in a series of agreements, including the ‘First Agreement of Principles 
Governing the Normalization of Relations’ of April 2013 signed by Prime Ministers of both countries. This 15-
points plan foresaw the disbandment of the parallel Serbian structures and incorporation into Kosovo institutions, 
and the creation of the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities. However, most of these agreements are 





making existing consociational arrangements obsolete. In this context, the role of the 
EU and their enlargement policy toward the Western Balkans is crucial, not only in 
influencing the Serbia-Kosovo relationships but also in shaping their democratisation 
processes. As one of the key actor, the EU largely influences the institutional design, 
and thus consociational democracy in Kosovo. This is achieved by adapting Kosovo's 
legislation and policies in relation to communities, in harmonisation with EU 
standards, but also acting as an agent of Europeanisation through enlargement policies 
and conditionality (Potter 2017). In this sense, the consociationalism in Kosovo is 
affected by the role of the EU, first through their direct involvement in state-building 
and democratisation processes; second, through diplomatic and political pressure in 
the implementation of the power-sharing provisions and; finally by mediating between 
both communities through the Brussels negotiations.  
By being present since 1999 in the international administration as one of the main 
pillars of UNMIK, the EU has significantly influenced post-conflict recovery and 
institution-building in Kosovo. Through ‘Standards before Status’ policy, the UN 
mission set European benchmarks that Kosovo must fulfil before resolving its political 
status, whereby multi-ethnic society and accommodation of the Serb community 
became one of the foremost priorities (Weller 2009). Also during the negotiations on 
future status, an institutionalisation of multi-ethnic society through the principles of 
consociational democracy appeared to be the central issue among the European 
mediators, led by former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari and his deputy, Austrian 
diplomat Albert Rohan. The international community and primarily the EU were 
determined to demonstrate that it is a key actor in peace-building and is capable of 
contributing to conflict resolution. Or as Hehir (2007: 138) succinctly put it: “It seems 
therefore that Kosovo’s status is too significant for the reputation of the UN and the 
EU to be left to Kosovars to determine.” In this sense, consociationalism corresponded 
with European values of minority rights, multi-ethnic and democratic society, 
therefore it was a guideline of sorts for a status proposal. And as we already emphasised 
the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement included all main 
characteristics of power-sharing arrangements.  
After the proclamation of Kosovo independence, the EU launched its largest civilian 
operation and Rule of Law mission, EULEX, with the main goal of developing an 
independent and multi-ethnic justice system, police and customs service. Moreover, 
the European Union also supported other Kosovo institutions and monitored 
implementation of consociational provisions, especially in respecting representation 
of non-majority communities (Bargués-Pedreny 2016). The EU followed an 
institution-building approach aimed at consensual settlements over the enforcement 
of the majoritarian principle, with the intention to develop a peaceful and multi-ethnic 
society that reflects European values. In other words, the European Union acts not only 
as a promoter and supervisor of consociational democracy but by offering integration 
opportunities for Kosovo also as a norm-oriented actor. 
While consociationalism in its liberal version supports incentives in inventing and 
developing a shared identity, it does not clarify what kind of identity politics should 
replace the prevalent ethnic power-sharing settlements. It is also unclear to what 
extent these arrangements diminish ethnic cleavages and establish a collective 
identity. More specifically, there is a growing concern that the institutionalisation of 
differences can only freeze ethnic conflict. Moreover, power-sharing leaves almost no 
opportunity for a shared identity and the emergence of a real sense of state unity (O’ 
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Flynn and Russel 2005). Thus, to explore identity issues and ethnic relations, the paper 
will elaborate on the citizenship policy in Kosovo.  
Citizenship and identity building 
Under the authority of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo gradually 
began to build governing institutions, while not dealing with the legal status of the 
country and its citizens. Because of Kosovo’s unresolved political status, during the 
UNMIK administration, there was no interest or incentives to regulate the citizenship 
issue. One of the main reasons for the neglect of this policy was UNMIK’s mandate as 
transitional administration, leaving the political future of Kosovo unresolved. All 
documents issued by UNMIK have defined Kosovars only as ‘residents’ not as ‘citizens’ 
of Kosovo. Therefore, the citizenship issue was related to the final status and became 
one of the highest priorities for Kosovo policymakers. As Krasniqi (2012: 363) remarks: 
“Citizenship, understood as status, right, and identity, has been central to the 
negotiation process and the overall political and constitutional settlement in Kosovo 
and the state-building process since 2008.” 
Immediately after the declaration of independence, the Kosovo Assembly adopted the 
Law on Citizenship, which allows dual and multiple citizenships and does not include 
any ethnic, religious, or racial requirements. The Law is based on a multicultural or 
pluralist model that aspires to political and legal integration of diverse ethnic 
communities in conformity with the constitution (Van Gunsteren 1998). In line with 
this approach, it refers to ‘communities’ to include not only larger ethnic groups but 
also smaller and other groups, defining minorities as ‘non-majority’ communities. 
Indeed, the Kosovo Law on Citizenship regarding ethnicity is neutral, addressing only 
the issue of citizenship (shtetësia, državljanstvo). According to some 
constitutionalists, this policy is in the spirit of the Ahtisaari Plan for an inclusive society 
and reflects attempts of the international community to build a democratic and multi-
ethnic state (Doli and Korenica 2013). However, its controversy lies in the fact that it 
defines citizens based exclusively on ethnic belonging rather than on political or civic 
affiliation. For instance, this legislation does not use the term Kosovar as a common 
denominator for all Kosovo citizens in any of its provisions. The basic provisions of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (Chap. 1, Art.3) states the following: “The 
Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and other 
Communities, governed democratically with full respect for the rule of law through its 
legislative, executive and judicial institutions.”  
On the one hand, there is a constitutional formulation that proclaims the civic 
character of the state. Moreover, participation and representation in political life are 
possible only as a member of a particular ethnicity. This inconsistency does not provide 
incentives by encouraging citizenship as membership or sense of belonging to the state, 
especially among ‘non-majority’ communities. Besides these conceptual ambiguities, 
the focal challenge to the citizenship policy is related to a citizen's commitment to 
Kosovo sovereignty. The lack of commitment among the Serb population, inhabiting 
mostly the northern part of the country, due to their contestation of the Kosovo state, 
is very problematic. In this context, citizenship policy and power-sharing provisions 
seem to be insufficient incentives for Serb social and cultural integration into Kosovo. 
On the other hand, the ongoing challenge for this citizenship regime also comes from 





opposing negotiations with Serbia, criticising the “Ahtisaarian” model of the multi-
ethnic state and proposing unification of Kosovo with Albania (Landau 2017: 10-17; 
Krasniqi 2012: 361-364). The citizenship and identity politics in Kosovo, resulting from 
existing consociational provisions, do not stimulate the development of a shared 
identity or political community. The lack of state-centred and inclusive citizenship 
politics only reinforces the loyalty of citizens to their respective ethnic groups, leading 
to a political system which, rather than promoting diversity, has just cemented 
ethnocracy. 
Transitional justice, dealing with the past, social cohesion, and civic education are all 
crucial aspects of post-conflict transformation. In this sense, moving from the ethnicity 
as a rigid and primordial determinant of belonging to a more open and multi-layered 
shared identity is not only a constitutive element of the state but also a profound 
contribution to the peace and democratisation process. Under existing ethnic relations 
and corporate consociationalism, the Kosovar society may share common citizenship, 
but as Smooha (2002: 424) argues, these relationships might “constitute a community, 
[but] lack common goals, do not feel solidarity with fellow citizens and do not have a 
moral commitment to the state.” In other words, in a deeply divided society, it seems 
that the way consociational arrangements have been established is less important than 
whether the state can be legitimised for all communities or not. Accordingly, 
citizenship is a necessary link between state and society, whereby obtaining citizenship 
is fundamental to the state legitimacy. The citizenry, as a promoter of state identity, is 
not supposed to replace ethnic belonging. Its purpose is, instead, in finding common 
ground for communities, to manage diversity within a state and hold the society 
together (Kymlicka 1995). In line with liberal consociational efforts, the citizens of 
Kosovo may have the opportunity to develop better state-society relations. Thus 
citizenship raises the question of the socio-political integration and motivation of the 
‘we’ feeling among Kosovar citizens. In this sense, Simonsen (2004: 291) recognised 
that: 
Nation building in Kosovo that encompasses not only the Albanians (inclusive 
nation-building) may seem far-fetched since majority, and minority members 
barely come close enough to talk anymore. However, it is useful to see nation-
building as a full span of processes than what usually occurs. In such a 
perspective, a sense of community among citizens may be virtually absent, but 
there may nevertheless be structures and policies at play facilitating its 
development.  
Concerning citizenship, citizens of Kosovo have a legal status, identification documents 
that facilitate international travel and representing their state when abroad, but these 
factors are insufficient to build strong ties between citizens and the state. Bearing in 
mind the de facto statelessness during the period of the ‘parallel system’ in the 1990s 
and de jure statelessness during the UNMIK administration until 2008, the citizenship 
regime, in the newly independent state, provides an opportunity to develop a common 
political body and state unity. However, it remains questionable if the citizenship 
policy is sufficiently effective to build and consolidate a common identity. Moreover, it 
is a complex process that depends on political unity, ethnic relations, social cohesion, 
economic perspective and other external factors. In his study on citizenship regimes, 
Krasniqi (2012: 360) has argued that Kosovo lacks the necessary integrative ideology 
to promote a certain identity within its citizenry. Thus the sense of identification with 
the state and its symbols is also lacking. Similar to the controversies about citizenship, 
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the debate about state symbols such as the flag, the coat of arms, and the anthem are 
politically very complex issues. The Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo provides the following 
proposal, “Kosovo shall have its own distinct, national symbols, including a flag, seal 
and anthem, reflecting its multi-ethnic character.” (Comprehensive Proposal for 
Kosovo Status Settlement 2007: Article 1.7). The Assembly adopted the flag 
immediately after the declaration of independence of Kosovo. It has a blue background, 
charged with a projection of Kosovo’s territory and six stars above. The stars are 
officially meant to symbolise Kosovo’s six major ethnic groups and the multi-ethnic 
character of the state, as defined by the Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of 
Kosovo 2008: Chap. I, Art. 6). The State anthem of Kosovo, titled ‘Europe’, was 
adopted by the Assembly on 11 June 2008. It has no lyrics and contains no references 
to any specific ethnic group, with the intention to avoid possible misinterpretations or 
discrimination of any community.  
Contested ethnopolitical relations are often manifested in cultural and social 
contestation of state symbolic settings, reproducing ambiguity toward citizenship. 
Thus, ethnic relations and attitudes toward symbols are characterised by opposing and 
antagonistic views. Although Kosovo’s state-building has followed an approach of 
multi-ethnicity and provided an inclusive citizenship policy, it is neither a nation-state 
of the overwhelming Albanian majority nor a civic state of all its citizens. Instead, as 
Landau (2017: 14-17) describes it, it is as a ‘state of communities’ which remains 
contested, and for different reasons continues to challenge the legitimacy of the state. 
The construction of a shared identity and enhancement of state legitimacy requires 
changes in the consociational framework. In the words of McGarry and O’Leary (1993: 
34-5)  
Not only does the division of powers need to be renegotiated continuously as a 
result of technological advances, economic transformations and judicial 
interventions, but to maintain stability supplemental consociational practices 
are often required at the federal and sub-central levels of government. 
Therefore, consociationalism in Kosovo based on liberal values might promote 
integration and empowers citizens to decide about their political representatives and 
institutions. One of the incentives to bridge ethnic division and to stimulate a shared 
community is the development of appropriate school curricula, unbiased textbooks, 
teacher training and student civic engagements to build trust, cooperation and to 
establish an inclusive and unitary educational system in Kosovo. Further, it should 
involve collaboration among universities in Albanian and Serb languages, faculties and 
study programs, exchange of academic staff and students. Other areas where 
communities may increasingly cooperate are in youth and civil society activities, 
sports, culture, media associations, and related sectors which might contribute to civic 
values and mutual trust, as a precondition for democracy and state legitimacy. These 
incentives, however, could be fruitful only if they are followed by modification of 
current power-sharing provisions to a more liberal and integrative model of 
consociational democracy.  
Conclusion 
According to consociationalism, institutional representation of main ethnic groups, 
together with other power-sharing mechanisms, significantly reduces the conflict 





conflict phase, a solid basis for the necessary cooperation between the political elites 
from different ethnic groups. However, broader and successive cooperation and 
confidence building at other social segments require more than power-sharing 
institutions. Consociational arrangements in Kosovo, through accommodation of the 
minorities, have initially solved the security dilemma, but in the long-term have 
created new problems in the consolidation of statehood and democracy. These 
problems are related to a fundamental democratic principle that it is communities and 
not only their elites which must share common political goals and values, since beyond 
political elites in Kosovo, there is little or no cooperation among Albanian and Serb 
communities. 
As illustrated in this case study, consociationalism through institutional engineering 
and political arrangements contributes to reducing ethnic tensions, but it is not very 
helpful in overcoming contested identities or in the consolidation of a multi-ethnic 
society. By analysing the critical features of consociational democracy, this research 
concludes that power-sharing arrangements have managed conflict and successively 
achieved institutionalisation of political disputes of ethnic groups. However, in its 
current constellation, it has failed to promote inter-ethnic cooperation, reconciliation 
and to foster trust among communities. Consequently, it has offered limited incentives 
to overcome ethnic divisions and develop a shared identity through inclusive 
citizenship. Findings of the article indicate that the outcomes of consociational 
provisions to state-building and ethnic relations are significantly challenged by 
contesting statehood, primarily by Serbia and Kosovo-Serb thus affecting the 
functionality of power-sharing governance, sovereignty and deepening mistrust 
among ethnic communities. The involvement of neighbouring countries in domestic 
politics and in power-sharing arrangements seriously challenges functionality and 
effectiveness of consociationalism. Furthermore, ongoing negotiations between 
Belgrade and Prishtina have triggered ethno-nationalistic sentiments, leaving little 
space for a genuine multi-ethnic society and reliance on consociational democracy. In 
contrast to other constituent communities, participation and representation of Serbs 
are concentrated strictly in the political elite, with an insufficient portion at the 
community level. Consequently, this has hindered the development of an inclusive 
citizenship policy as a bond between the state and its citizens. Other weaknesses of the 
consociational approach include negligence in addressing the role and involvement of 
external actors in internal political affairs, in our case Serbia’s impact on Kosovo.  
This article has shown that despite implementation of consociational power-sharing 
arrangements, state legitimacy and citizenship remain ineffective in promoting shared 
identity. Instead of the pluralism of identities- in the name of multi-ethnicity, it has led 
to the institutionalisation of ethnic differences. As a consequence, mitigation of ethnic 
division was unsuccessful, and the political community has little chance to be 
constituted. The capability of corporate consociationalism to transform ethnic 
cleavages was also diminished by pre-determination of group identities through 
institutional accommodation, thus rewarding ethnopolitical hardliners and 
disincentivising cross-community cohesion and overarching identity formation. 
Furthermore, this article emphasises that in the long term, in contrast to the corporate 
type, the liberal consociationalism model has better chances of increasing state 
legitimacy and promoting democracy in ethnically divided societies. In the liberal 
consociational model, the constituent groups of society are self-determined, with 
identities formed as constructive and contingent. Therefore the liberal type of 
consociationalism, which promotes the idea that political identity should be 
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encouraged as an outcome of democratic processes, has a higher potential to overcome 
ethnic divisions and create incentives for a civic-based identity. Without long-term and 
comprehensive efforts to promote a shared identity, the state building process cannot 
be completed. A crucial role in these efforts can be played by the European Union, 
through a more active mediation of Serbia-Kosovo disputes but also through the 
enlargement and Europeanisation process. In other words, the European Union should 
speak with one voice and act beyond its actual normative power approach. It should 
use not only a ‘stick and carrot’ approach and diplomatic pressure to encourage 
political leaders of both parties to find a compromise for the final agreement but also 
promote business community, civil society, academic and non-governmental 
incentives to improve relations and trust among all communities, in the areas of 
economy, education, art, culture etc. Further, the EU should offer a clear membership 
perspective by providing extensive support for political, juridical and economic reform 
for all Western Balkan states through pre-accession programmes and donor projects 
known also as the Berlin Process. Without EU active enlargement policies for this 
region and concrete efforts for structural reforms and socio-economic improvements, 
destabilisation or even conflicts might escalate, with dramatic consequences for the 
whole region and the EU itself.    
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